The final cause of North American Aviation was clear in 1959: “Man. Moon. Decade” (pp. 193, 287). The goal was the “to go to the moon” (p. 133).
The material cause of North American Aviation’s Apollo program involved “three million pieces” that were organized into “eighty-eight subsystems” (pp. 258, 275, 216).
The formal causes of North American Aviation’s Apollo program are numerous. For example, Apollo program was most demanding. Gray writes, “Every facet of the Apollo program was in some way more intricate and demanding than anything in the aircraft industry had take up to that time” (p. 134). Further, the Apollo program was the largest contract in history. According to Gray, “North American Aviation was going to build and NASA was going to pay for” the Apollo with “the largest contract in history” (p. 144). Further, the Apollo program was most efficient. Gray writes, “It would have to be, by any measure, the most efficient structure ever built” (p. 151). Further, the Apollo was the biggest rocket ever made. Gray writes, “The first stage of the Saturn rocket was by far the largest booster ever built” (p. 152). Further, the Apollo program was miraculous. Gray writes, “At a time in history where a flawless weld of a few feet was considered miraculous, the S-2 [second stage] called for a half a mile of flawless welds” (p. 154).
Further, the Apollo program was most precise. Gray writes, “No human beings, no matter what their skills, could be trained to work at this level of precision” (p. 156). Further, the Apollo program was perfect. Gray writes, “A single speck trapped in the molten metal was a potential crack-starter that could lead to a catastrophic failure; any imperfection was absolutely unacceptable” (p. 156). Further, the Apollo program used “the world’s largest surgical chamber” (p. 156), “the world’s largest pressure cooker” (p. 157), and “the world’s largest lathe” (p. 157). Further, the Apollo program was most accountable. Gray writes, “the North American designers… were in a situation where practically every atom had to be accounted for” (p. 168). Further, the Apollo program was most dangerous. Gray writes that the three astronauts on Apollo 11 “had volunteered for the most dangers mission in history” (p. 234). Further, the Apollo program triggered the most intense inquiry. Gray writes, “The Apollo Review Board… launched the most intense technological inquiry of all time” (p. 235). Further, the Apollo program was built by the most respected company. Gray writes, “North American was the most respect aerospace company in the world” (p. 251). Further, the Apollo program was the greatest adventure. Gray writes, “Storms… had lifted them out of he humdrum of their ordinary lives and put them to work on one of the greatest adventures in history” (p. 255). Further, the Apollo program was the finest machine ever. Gray writes, “Anybody with hands-on experience knew that it was the finest piece of machinery ever assembled” (p. 255). Further, the Apollo program had the largest audience. Gray writes, “It was being watched by the largest television audience in history” (p. 271). Therefore, North American Aviation was prepared to lead the space industry, because North American Aviation guided the Apollo program which had the largest contract, efficient, the largest rocket ever built, the greatest adventure, the finest machine and the largest audience. Plus, North American Aviation guided the Apollo program which was demanding, miraculous, precise, perfect, accountable, dangerous, intense, and respected.
The principal agent primarily responsible for the Apollo program was North American Aviation in Downey, CA. According to Harrison Storms (1912-1992), “What NASA needs right now is a coach” (p. 94). Gray writes, “a collection of technical hotshots began drifting into Downey in 1961” (p. 68). And, according to my father, a group of technical hotshots started working in at NAA in Downey in 1955 in order plan for a mission to the moon.
The preparing agent for Apollo Program was North American Aviation. According to Gray, “North American Aviation, a scrappy young outfit with a reputation for creativity, was run by James Kindelberger (1895-1962), a larger than life airplane builder” (p. 24). Kindleberger worked with “a structural designer named John Leland Atwood (1904-1999)” (p. 25). Kindleberger and Atwood prepared for the Apollo Program by successfully reaching nineteen milestones in history.
In 1955 North American Aviation created Rocketdyne, Autonetics and Atomics International. Gray writes, “Atwood suggested to John Moore [director of the guidance group] that he name his outfit Electrodyne, but Moore’s people like Autonetics, so Atwood said, ‘Fine, if that’s what you want, it’s okay with me’” (p. 80). Thus, Kindleberger and Atwood moved the theoretical engineers working with rocket engines to a division called Rocketdyne in Canoga Park, CA. The practical Ph.D.s specializing in guidance systems were moved to a division called Autonetics in Downey, CA. And and advisory group focusing on energy development were appointed to Atomics International in Canoga Park, CA.
In 1957 North American Aviation appointed Storms as “the chief engineer” of Rocketdyne (p. 28). According to Mark Wade, “North American's rocket division, dubbed Rocketdyne, would go on to be the preeminent American liquid engine rocket builder, building the engines that would take the first American to orbit, the first man to the moon, and power the Space Shuttle” (www.astronautix.com/n/navaho.html).
In January 1961 North American Aviation moved Storms to Downey, CA, in order to work in the space business. Gray writes, “His concept was simplicity itself; surround yourself with brilliant people… He had a little list. And on it was the cream of the crop of North American Aviation” (p. 65). Further, Gray writes, “This was another facet of Storm’s plan: to hire every hardheaded, practical Ph.D. he could lay his hands on until he had more than anybody else” (p. 66).
In 1962 North American Aviation built several rocket engines for the Saturn rocket. According to Boeing History, “North American’s Rocketdyne built the five F-1 engines for the first stage, the J-2 engine for the second and third stage, the backup injector for the ascent engine of the Lunar Excursion Module, and the command module’s reaction control system used for capsule repositioning during reentry.” Further, according to Boeing History, North American Aviation’s Autonetics “built the command and service modules and the launch escape subsystem”
Therefore, North American Aviation was prepared to lead the Space Industry, because North American Aviation completed “8,500 original drawings and 195,000 engineering man-hours” for the B-25 Mitchell in 1939, was led by a man who trusted in the Lord and believed in His Church in April of 1940, built the P-51 Mustang and “the most aerodynamically perfect” plane in May of 1940, built the Navaho missile, employed “experts in rockets” and dominated “American manned spaceflight for seventy years” in 1946, built the F-86 Sabre, a fast and reliable jet engine in 1947, produced the T-6 Texan and trained “most of the Allied pilots” in World War II in 1948, developed the X-10, “the fastest turbojet-powered aircraft” and built an “early-form computer” for processing in 1953, employed theoretical engineers at Rocketdyne, practical Ph.D.s at Autonetics and advisors at Atomics International in 1955, was the “preeminent American liquid engine rocket builder” in 1957, learned how to build the B-70 Bomber that surfs “on the crest” of its “own supersonic shock wave” (p. 29) in 1958, the X-15 and developed the first American astronauts in 1959, built the GMA-77 Hound Dog and became committed to “doing space stuff… legitimately” (p.54) in 1960, employed “brilliant people” and hired “hardheaded, practical Ph.D’s” (p. 66) in January of 1961, developed “one of the most advanced rocket engine plants in the world” (p. 79) in May of 1961, was selected to build the second stage and Saturn rocket in September of 1961, flawlessly launched a liquid hydrogen “Apollo-type” vehicle in October of 1961, was selected to “develop and build” the Apollo in November of 1961, and built the engines for the three stages of the Apollo along with the engine for the Lunar Module and the control system in 1962.
North American Aviation was assisted by thirty thousand employees, seventy-five Ph.D’s and thirty major companies. Gray writes, “Storms had more than 30,000 people working for him” (p. 215). Further, Gray writes, Storms “had seventy-five guys on his payroll with doctorate degrees” (p. 133). They were “the cream of the crop of North American Aviation” (p. 65). The group of seventy-five Ph.D.’s had the following job description. “This branch numbering about 75 engineers investigates aerodynamics, stability and control, gas dynamic heating, flight performance, space flight trajectory analysis, contract studies, independent research and development for all Space Division projects including S-11 and Apollo” (Job Announcement, North American Aviation). Further, North American Aviation was assisted by major companies. Gray writes, “North American would have thirty major corporations working for it, and pieces of the moon ship would come from almost every state in the Union” (p. 135). The first four companies to assist North American Aviation were Collins Radio for communications, Garrett Corporation for the cabin environment, Honeywell for stabilization and control, and Lockheed for the launch escape system. Therefore, North American Aviation was prepared to lead the Space Industry, because North American Aviation employed thirty thousand people and seventy-five Ph.D.’s and were assisted by thirty major companies in “almost every state in the Union” (p. 135).
The two instrumental agents of North American Aviation were money and “traceability” (p. 170). Money funded the “largest contract in history” (p. 144) which was directed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. NASA agreed to pay North American Aviation $884 million dollars to North American Aviation for “eleven mockups and eleven flight-ready spacecraft” (p. 145). Gray writes, “NASA was to pay $884 million in costs… but before the program was over [the costs] would double and then double again” (p. 145) for a total of about two and a half billion dollars. Further, traceability was necessary in the Apollo program and the most precise project in history. Every part and tool had a “genealogy” and “an account or history of the descent” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1966, p. 944). Gray writes, “The saying was, ‘If you order a piece of plywood, they want to know which tree it came from’” (p. 170). To give an example of traceability, Charles Feltz (1916-2003), the chief engineer in the Apollo program, said that “there were [numerous] steps in the manufacture of bolts and they had to be certified at every step.” 1. A single bolt “was subjected to rigorous testing.” 2. The “steel rod it was milled from had been tested.” 3. The “billet from which the rod was extruded” was tested. 4. The “ingot from which the billet was forged” was tested. 5. “They knew where the iron ore had come from.” 6. They “knew which mine and what shaft” the iron ore had come from (p. 171). Thus, North American Aviation was prepared to lead the space industry because North American Aviation was funded by money from NASA and traced the genealogy of every part and tool used to build the Apollo program.
The counseling agent of North American Aviation is Harrison Storms who said, “What NASA needs right now is a coach” (p. 95). Storms was responding to the problem in July 1961 where four companies were drafting proposals for the Apollo project: “Aerojet, Convair, Douglas, and North American” (p. 89). Storms delegated work to Aerojet, Convair, Douglas and to twenty-five other companies. A second counseling agent is Mark Wade who said, “North American had become the pre-eminent company in rocket engines, for the booster rockets, and inertial and stellar navigation, and for the guidance system” (www.astronautix.com/s/storms.html). Thus, North American Aviation was prepared to lead the space industry, because North American Aviation was the coach of a team of thirty major corporations, and because North American Aviation was the “preeminent company in rocket engines.”
History shows when North American Aviation became especially prepared to lead the space industry. On January 27, 1967, an electrical fire in the cabin spread rapidly and killed the three astronauts, Virgil Grissom, Ed White, and Roger B. Chaffee. NASA established a review board, and all Apollo manned flights were suspended for 20 months. Gray writes, "Storms [Chief Engineer of North American operations in Downey] and Pearce [head of North American operations at the Cape] mounted the gantry elevator and rode to the top [of Apollo 1] for a look at what had been the most sophisticated machine in history a mere forty-eight hours earlier. Now it was a smoking hulk” (p. 233). North American Aviation along with NASA’s review board began immediately to look for the cause of the fire. Gray writes, NASA’s review board “was a distinguished group, and within hours of their appointment they launched the most intense technological inquiry of all time” (p. 235). Further, North American Aviation examined each part of Apollo 1. Gray writes, “They would take the spacecraft apart one bolt at a time and inspect each piece as it was removed” (p. 236). As a result, NAA and NASA discovered the cause of the fire on January 27, 1967. Gray writes, “Joe Shea [Lead Manager at NASA] was right, of course: there was nothing fundamentally wrong with the ship. The first problem had been caused by high-pressure oxygen on the launch pad” (p. 251). Thus, North American Aviation was prepared to lead the space industry, because North American Aviation examined each part of Apollo 1 and took apart “the spacecraft apart one bolt at a time” (p. 236).
An analogy shows that North American Aviation’s Apollo program was successfully completed at a high “level of precision” (p. 156). Gray writes how the building the Saturn rocket was “like building a locomotive to the tolerance of a Swiss watch” (p. 89). Further, Gray writes, “The level of accuracy required for such a trip was almost beyond comprehension, but try to imagine throwing a dime into the slot of a parking meter from three hundred miles away” (p. 176). Thus because North American Aviation’s Apollo program had “the tolerance of a Swiss watch” (p. 89) and a high “level of accuracy” (p. 176), North American Aviation was prepared to lead the space industry.
The sign with the message that North American Aviation was prepared to lead the space industry happened in 1961 when Harrison Storms wanted to hire McCarthy. The problem was that McCarthy needed to write a dissertation in order to complete a Ph.D. program at Cal Tech in Los Angeles before going to work at North American Aviation. Gray writes, “Storms needed” McCarthy to work full time but McCarthy “was in the middle of writing his doctoral thesis at Cal Tech” (p. 67). As a result, Storms solved the problem by assisting with the dissertation. Gray writes, “Storms laughed” and said, “Don’t worry about your thesis. I’ll take care of it.” Further, Gray writes, “McCarthy’s thesis – ‘Aerodynamic Wakes from Bodies of Revolution at High Mach Numbers’ – was a daunting task by any standard, but Storms simply set an engineering team to work on it as if it were a proposal for a contract” (p. 67). Consequently, the dissertation was complete in one week. Gray writes, “Months of research and analysis were collapsed into days” and “McCarthy made his final presentation to the university faculty one week later” (p. 67). Then McCarthy began working full time at NAA the next day. Thus, North American Aviation was prepared to lead the space industry, because an engineering team at North American Aviation wrote a Ph.D. doctoral dissertation for Cal Tech in one week.
The passions triggered by North American Aviation were numerous. North American Aviation triggered joy, because NAA hired talented engineers who were allowed to fail, since intelligent workers learn from their mistakes. Gray writes, NAA was “the best of all possible worlds where bright guys could make honest mistakes and still get paid” (p. 160). Further, NASA triggered sadness in the workers at North American Aviation when it cancelled the Apollo program. Gray writes, “The plug was pulled on the assembly lines, and the tens of thousands of welders and riveters, now incredibly skilled virtuoso artisans, were scattered to the winds” (p. 286). Further, NAA triggered despair, since the mistakes seemed to add up. Gray writes, “Before Harold Raynor” retired [as vice-president at NAA], “the marketing guys put together a film clip in Harold’s honor entitled ‘You Got to Expect Losses,’ a quick-cut reprise of every exploding and test failure of the last thirty years” (p. 163). Further, North American Aviation gave hope to the people at NASA. Gray writes, “For practical men like Bob Gilruth [(1913-2000) the director of NASA’s Manned Space Craft Center] and Jim Webb [(1906-1992) the administrator of NASA], there could not have been a second’s hesitation back in 1961 about which design team they would trust with the future of the U.S. space program” (p. 250). Thus, North American Aviation was prepared to lead the space industry, because talented engineers were allowed to make mistakes, test failures were acknowledged, and leaders at NASA placed their trust in NAA.
The foresight by the leaders at North American Aviation was strong and confident. Gray writes, “If you were to bring a problem to Harrison Storms, he would say that if you gave him 30,000 of the best people he could lay his hands on and you had every citizen chip in fifty bucks over the next ten years, you could kiss that problem goodbye whatever it was” (p. 2878). If we can put a man on the moon, then we can solve other massive problems. Thus, North American Aviation was prepared to lead the space industry, because North American Aviation used foresight to solve enormous problems.
The circumspection of the leaders at North American Aviation was strong and active. In 1965 the tanks for the Saturn rocket exploded on the test stand. Rather than feel despair and stop the program, the NAA engineers acted with circumspection and found the cause of the explosion. Gray writes, “Storms was in his office when he got the call. One of the big titanium tanks for the spacecraft’s main engine had exploded on the test stand. By the time Storms reached the scene there were already half a dozen engineers down in the pit and a score of others peering over the edge” (p. 171). Then the engineers examined the pieces. Gray writes, “The detective work on these disasters always began with microscopic scrutiny of the evidence” (p. 171). Then the engineers found the problem. Since the titanium was strong and the welds were accurate allowing the tanks to use water, they discovered that there was a problem with the nitrogen tetroxide fuel. Gray write, “They made a quick trip to the refinery, and the operators there said they had indeed made a change in the process. Since it was for the Apollo, they had decided on their own initiative to triple-distill the oxidizer and see if they could make it as pure as possible” (p. 172). As a result, the engineers learned that pure nitrogen tetroxide destroys titanium and that nitrogen tetroxide with water preserves titanium. Gray writes, “The problem disappears when you add a dash of water” (p. 172). Thus, North American Aviation was prepared to lead the space industry, because North American Aviation used circumspection find microscopic problems underneath huge explosions.
I shall now use my freedom to review the above deliberation. Hmm… All the reasons are good. I shall now use my freedom to make a choice. I have decided that I prefer the formal cause and the preparing agent cause. I shall now use my freedom to make a command. It is reasonable to conclude that North American Aviation’s Apollo program was prepared to lead the space industry, because North American Aviation was most efficient (p. 151), most precise (p. 156), and most accountable (p. 168). Further, North American Aviation was prepared to lead the space industry in 1946 when it built the Navaho which gave North American Aviation “a collection of first-rate experts in rockets and guidance systems” (p. 80).
Objections to the reasonable conclusion above are four. First, the Apollo 1 disaster proved that North American Aviation was not ready to lead the space industry. On February 21, 1967, three astronauts perished inside the command module of Apollo 1 for two reasons: the command module contained pure-oxygen and the astronauts were unable to open the door.
The response to the first objection is to assert that North American Aviation rejected the plan for pure-oxygen in the command module. Gray writes, “The North American team didn’t like the idea of a pure-oxygen environment because of the fire danger. Toby Friedman argued against it vehemently” (p. 138). Further, North American Aviation rejected the plan for the door to open toward the inside. Gray writes, “North American had proposed an explosive escape hatch on the ship… They had been using explosive bolts to flow canopies of fighter aircraft since the early fifties” (p. 139). Thus, North American Aviation was not responsible for the Apollo 1 disaster. Further, the plans of North American Aviation to avoid possible disaster in the command module were rejected by NASA. Gray writes, “Max Faget [(1921-2004) Director of Engineering at NASA] had spent Word War II in a U.S. Navy submarine and the idea of an explosive hatch in the side of the ship made Max’s skin crawl” (p. 139). North American Aviation was prepared to lead the space industry, because every manned rocket after Apollo 1 had command modules without pure-oxygen and with doors that open toward the outside. Gray writes that Charles Feltz at NAA “was bent on saving the outward-opening hatch if nothing else” (p. 141).
The second objection to the conclusion above was given by Sam Phillips, the “Apollo program director from NASA” (p. 198). In 1965 Phillips investigated North American Aviation in Downey and then sent a letter to Lee Atwood, stating, “I am definitely not satisfied with the progress and outlook of the programs. I could not find a substantive basis for confidence in future performance” (p. 201). Further, Phillips stated, “Costs were out of control and schedules were turning to mush” (p. 199). As a result, Phillips was convinced that North American Aviation was not prepared to lead the space industry.
The response to the second objection is to observe the machinery in Downey that Phillips failed to notice. Gray writes, Phillips “examined only the paper trail and paid little attention to the hardware itself” (p. 202). Further, Gray writes, “Years later, one of the key men” assisting Sam Phillips “would apologize to Paul Wickham,” (p. 202), a “structural engineer” (p. 90) at North America Aviation, for the deceptive letter written by Phillips in 1965. Consequently, people observing the hardware and structural engineering at NAA in 1965 led them to conclude that North American Aviation was prepared to lead the space industry.
The third objection to the conclusion above was given by Major General Robert Greer (1915-1976), the vice commander of the Air Force Systems Command's Space Systems Division (SSD). In 1966 Greer observed the Apollo program and concluded that North American Aviation was not prepared to lead the space industry. Gray writes, “Greer could see that the project was choking on its own complexity” (p. 208). The problem was that the “three million pieces” organized into “eighty-eight subsystems” (p. 258, 275, 216) were most complex and it was difficult to bring about “the most efficient structure ever built” (p. 151) where “practically every atom had to be accounted for” (p. 168).
The response to the third objection is to state that the solution, according to Greer, was to encourage conversations and discussions. Gray writes, “He decided to start knocking down fences and get them all talking to each other. The first thing every morning he began cramming as many key people as he could into… a big conference room” where “the battles between various jurisdictions gave everybody a better sense of where they were headed” (p. 208). And where they were headed was clear. The final cause of North American Aviation was clear: “Man. Moon. Decade” (pp. 193, 287) and North American Aviation was prepared to lead the space industry to get to the moon.
The fourth objection to the conclusion above was given by the Report of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences from the United States Senate printed on April 2, 1967. The Report examined the fire in the command module on Apollo 1 on February 21, 1967 and blamed North American Aviation for mistakes in the wiring. According to the Report, “Deficiencies in design, manufacture, installation, and quality control exist in the electrical wiring” (p. 245).
There are five ways to respond to this weak fourth objection. First, North American Aviation requested numerous times that NASA reject the option of having pure oxygen in the command module. Gray writes, “The files were bulging with memos pleading with NASA not to use pure oxygen because of the fire hazard” (p. 245).
Second, North American Aviation rejected the hatch on the command module of Apollo 1 designed by NASA, because the hatch was clumsy. Gray writes, “The hatch took ninety second to open even under ideal conditions” (p. 245).
Third, Charles Feltz (1916-2003), the chief engineer in the Apollo program for North American Aviation rejected NASA’s design of the command module. Gray writes, “If Houston had left poor old Charlie Feltz alone in the first place, Grissom would have been able to hit a button and blow out the side of the ship” (p. 245).
Fourth, North American Aviation had the foresight to remove the possible fires in the Apollo command module. Gray writes, “A fire on the pad was exactly the kind of unforeseeable event that Feltz had been talking about for four years earlier” (p. 245).
Fifth, North American Aviation understood that the Report of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences printed on April 2, 1967, was the Senate’s way of downplaying the real mistakes by NASA by highlighting the fictional errors of North American Aviation. Gray writes, “Atwood… had enough evidence in hand to sink NASA” (p. 245). In summary, the fire in the command module on Apollo 1 on February 21, 1967, was caused by pure oxygen and hatch that opened toward the inside, two things approved by NASA and rejected by North American Aviation.
Thus, North American Aviation was prepared to lead the space industry to get to the moon, because engineers at North American Aviation approved the option of having impure oxygen in the command module, accepted a sophisticated hatch that opened quickly, approved of a hatch that opened toward the outside, prepared for “fires on the pad” for several years, and understood the real engineering mistakes by NASA.
Final remarks. The intellectual and moral virtues of the leaders of North American Aviation brought about Neil Armstrong’s successful docking on the moon. When Apollo 11 was four minutes away from lift-off on Wednesday, July 16, 1969, “three priests in the grandstand stood up, and others around them followed their example. A wave of silence swept through the crowd and across the island and down the highways and beaches” (p. 274). According to Mike Gray, “The networks estimated the six hundred million people were watching the picture” (p. 283). Six hundred million people watched the moon landing on July 20, 1969.
© By Theodore Faulders, July 6, 2020.